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Children grow up in environments saturated with tools and objects 
which they must learn to use. One of the most efficient ways in which 
children do this is by imitating. Recent work has shown that, in contrast 
to non-human primates, when young children learn by imitating they 
focus more on reproducing the specific actions used than the actual 
outcomes achieved.From about 18 months of age children will routinely 
copy arbitrary and unnecessary actions. This puzzling behaviour is 
called ‘over-imitation’. By documenting similarities exhibited bychildren 
from a large, industrialised city and children from remote Bushman 
communities in southern Africa,we provide here the first indication that 
over-imitation is a universal human trait. We also show that over-
imitation isunaffected by the age of the child, testing environment, or 
familiarity of the demonstrating adult. Furthermore we argue that, 
although seemingly maladaptive, over-imitation reflects an evolutionary 
adaptation fundamental to the development and transmission of human 
culture. 
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Research has recorded young children’s propensity for learning how to use 
objects by copying others – a propensity that stands them apart from other 
animals12. That children have been shown to be strong imitators in this way 
makes intuitive sense. Directly replicating others affords the rapid acquisition 
of novel behaviors while at the same timeavoiding the potential pitfalls and 
false end-points that can come from trial-and-error learning. Recentresearch 
however, has revealed that young children will copy the explicit actions of an 
adult demonstrator even when a more efficient method is available and even if 
copying the adult’s actions results in failure to bring about the demonstrated 
outcome345. For example, children aged 3 to 5 years were trained to identify 
the causally irrelevant parts of novel action sequences performed byanadult 
on familiar household objects (such as retrieving a toy from a plastic jar after 
first stroking the side of the jar with a feather)6.The children then watched as 
the adult demonstrated a sequence of actionson novel objects whereby the 
causalsignificance of the actions was directly observable.Despite the training, 
children still reproduced causally irrelevant actionsand they continued to do so 
even when specifically instructed by the adult to only copy necessary actions. 
Over-imitationemergesin the second year and becomes increasingly 
pervasive through the pre-school period57.Why children engage in this high 
fidelity copying is a topic of increasing debate689. Yet interpretations of over-
imitation, and assumptions regarding its meaningfulness, are constrained by 
limiting documentation to children living in relatively affluent, urban, 
Westernised cultures. There are reasons to suspect that over-imitation might 
not occur in other environments.  
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
09
.3
04
9.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
9 
Ap
r 2
00
9
 3
In most Western cultures typical parent-child interaction is 
characterised by parents frequently demonstrating objects for their children 
and highlighting their critical features1011. Children are commonly shown what 
things are and how to use them via ordered, guided instruction. Children can 
thusassume that adults have tested the rationality of their novel actions and 
hence that these actions are attempts to transmit relevant knowledge912.This 
is fertile ground for over-imitation to flourish. But instruction of this kind does 
not happen in all cultures. In many indigenous communities, and certainly 
among hunter-gatherers, there is minimal adult tuition related to object 
manipulation. Children are mostly expected to learn through observation, and 
caregivers rarely explore object use with their children1314. If over-imitation 
emerges fromthe pedagogical approach adopted by parents inWesternised 
cultures, children living in more traditional environments should be less likely 
to engage in it. We thus hypothesised that child descendents of hunter-
gatherers would over-imitate at reduced rates when compared with children 
from a Western background.  
To test this hypothesis, in Experiment 1 we studiedyoungchildren (2-
6yrs.)from two Bushman communities in remote regions of the Kalahari 
Desert(Witdraai, South Africa and Ngwatle, Botswana – see Fig. 1), and 
children of the same age range fromBrisbane, a large urban city in Australia. 
The Bushman children are recent ancestors of true hunter-gatherers living in 
communities where many aspects of traditional culture are maintained15.By 
contrast, the Brisbane children are typical of those living inlarge, Westernised, 
industrialised cities. The Brisbane children were tested sitting at a desk in a 
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quiet room of their day-care centre. The Kalahari children were tested outside, 
sitting on the ground near their homes.  
Insert Figure 1 about here16 
 
Children participated in one of two conditions. In a Demonstration 
Conditionchildren watched an adult use a miscellaneous object (e.g., a blue 
stick) first in a causally irrelevant way (e.g., wiping it across the top of a novel 
box) and then in a causally connected manner (e.g., to open the box by 
poking out dowels that secured its lid shut – see Fig. 2). Following 
demonstration the box andobject were given to the child. This procedure was 
repeated for two more boxes, each with different action-object pairings (see 
Supplementary Material for full details). To assess spontaneous production of 
the target actions children in a No Demonstration condition were given the 
boxes and associated objectsone by one, but did not see any actions 
demonstrated. 
There were two dependent variables for each box: (1) reproducing the 
irrelevant action; and (2) using the object to open the box. For each box, 
children were awarded 1 point for performing the target action and 0 for failing 
to do so. Summed across boxes, children could thus score between 0 and 3 
for each variable. 
 
Insert Figure2 about here 
 
Most of the children in the Demonstration conditionsubsequently 
produced the irrelevant actions on all three boxes,unlike the children in the No 
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Demonstration condition (meanDemonstration=2.69 boxes, meanNo 
Demonstration=0.13 boxes, independent samples t-test, t(30) = 14.81, two-tailed 
P<0.001) (Fig. 3). They were also more likely to openthe boxes using the 
object (meanDemonstration=2.19, meanNo Demonstration=0.25, independent samples t-
test, t(30) = 6.20, two-tailed P<0.001). Critically, and contrary to our 
hypothesis, children in the Demonstration condition produced the irrelevant 
actions at similar rates regardless of their cultural environment (meanBrisbane 
Children=2.87, meanKalahariChildren=2.50, independent samples t-test, t(14) = 1.27, 
two-tailed P=0.224). They also used the object to open the boxes at similar 
rates (meanBrisbane Children=2.25, meanKalahariChildren=2.12, independent samples 
t-test, t(14) = 0.22, two-tailed P = 0.830). 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
Childrenin the Demonstration condition consistently copied the 
irrelevant actions and object use techniques to which they were exposed. 
Children who did not see the actions demonstrated rarely produced them. 
Thus, children in the Demonstration condition were not exhibiting the target 
actions because they represent pre-potent responses or because they are the 
most obvious means of bringing about the desired outcome. Rather, their 
behaviour is consistent with experimental studies whichshow 
children’svehement attraction to replicate with high fidelity the object-directed 
behaviours of others. This pervasive behaviour is attested to by the similarity 
of responses, irrespective of cultural background. Furthermore high-fidelity 
imitation provesunrestricted by the nature of the experimental setting or a 
specific socio-economic context. 
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One suggestion why young children imitate seemingly irrelevant 
actions is that they lack the cognitive sophistication necessary to appreciate 
how specific actions are causally related to the outcomes of those actions 
71718. To investigate this possibility, in Experiment 2 we tested over-imitation in 
a new group of Bushman children aged from 2 to 13 years. If over-imitation is 
a function of young children’s immaturity in discerning the causal efficacy of a 
model’s actions, older children should be less likely to reproduce irrelevant 
actions. As with Experiment 1, children were split into Demonstration and No 
Demonstration groups. After they had been given opportunity to explore the 
apparatus, children in the No Demonstration condition now watched the 
model demonstrate the target actions. If over-imitation emerges from 
children’s failure to comprehend the causal relations between actions and 
their consequent outcomes children in the No Demonstration condition who 
discover how to operate the apparatus on their own should be disinclined to 
copy the irrelevant actions subsequently shown to them by the model.  
The participantswere !Xun andKhwe children living in Platfontein, an 
immigrant Bushman settlement on the outskirts of Kimberley, in South Africa’s 
Northern Cape.These groups were relocated to South Africa from Angola and 
Namibia after the end of the border war in which they had sided with the 
South African Defence Force which had employed them as trackers19. The 
children had grown up in a tented camp, Schmidsdrift, in the Northern Cape 
countryside, before being housed in the sub-economic settlement in 
Platfontein19.   
A single demonstrator conducted all testing in Experiment 1. To ensure 
that the responses of the children were not attributable to something 
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inadvertently associated with demonstrator characteristics, in Experiment 2 
three members of the local community and three visiting experimenters acted 
as demonstrators. All testing was conducted in a small room of a community 
centre and children were tested individually while sitting at a desk opposite 
the model. Children were randomly assigned to one of two conditions – 
Demonstration and No-demonstration + Demonstration. The Demonstration 
condition was identical to Experiment 1. The No-demonstration + 
Demonstration condition was split into two phases. As per the No-
demonstration condition of Experiment 1, children in thiscondition were first 
given the apparatus and associated objects one by one, without seeing any 
actions demonstrated(No-demonstration phase). After they had opportunity to 
explore all three apparatuses the children then watched the model 
demonstrate the target actions and were once more given the apparatus as 
per the Demonstration condition (Post-demonstration phase). 
The type of demonstrator (stranger or local community member) had 
no impact on children’s performance (see Supplementary Results). This is not 
considered further. Replicating the results of Experiment 1 (Fig. 2), children in 
the Demonstration groupproduced the irrelevant actions significantly more 
than children in the no-demonstrationphase of the No-demonstration + 
Demonstration condition (meanDemonstration=2.79, meanNo-demonstration=0.14, 
independent samples t-test, t(60) = 19.53, two-tailed P<0.001) and they 
opened more boxes (meanDemonstration=2.59, meanNo-demonstration=0.00, 
independent samples t-test, t(60) = 17.46, two-tailed P<0.001). 
The sample was split into younger (aged 2-5 years) and older (aged 6-
13 years) children. In the Demonstration condition, younger children produced 
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fewer irrelevant actions than older children (meanYounger=2.65, meanOlder=3.00, 
independent samples t-test, t(32) = 2.22, two-tailed P = 0.034), and opened 
fewer boxes (meanYounger=2.35, meanOlder=2.93, independent samples t-test, 
t(32) = 2.25, two-tailed P = 0.032). There were no age-related differences for 
children in the No-demonstration + Demonstration condition (see 
Supplementary Results). 
Children in the No-demonstration + Demonstration condition did not 
produce the irrelevant actions spontaneously but did so after seeing the 
model enact them (meanNo-demonstration=0.14, meanPost-demonstration=2.75, paired 
samples t-test, t(27) = 15.76, two-tailed P<0.001). These children also did not 
spontaneously open the boxes by object but did so after watchingthe 
model(meanNo-demonstration=0.00, meanPost-demonstration=2.75, paired samples t-
test, t(27) = 22.54, two-tailed P<0.001).Further, children copied the model’s 
irrelevant actions at equivalent rates irrespective of whether or not they had 
prior opportunity to explore the boxes (meanDemonstration=2.79, meanPost-
demonstration=2.75, paired samples t-test, t(60) =0.31, two-tailed P=0.759). 
Similarly, opportunity to explore the boxes did not impact children’s tendency 
to copy the demonstrator’s use of the objectto get the boxes 
open(meanDemonstration=2.59, meanPost-demonstration=2.75, paired samples t-test, 
t(60) =0.88, two-tailed P =0.385). Moreover, 10 children in the No-
demonstration phase discovered by trial-and-error how to open all three 
boxes by hand. Despite having identified on their own how to do this, in the 
Post-modelling phase each of these children subsequently reproduced both 
the model’s irrelevant actions and object use on all three boxes.  
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A possible explanation for young children’s propensity for over-imitation 
is that they lack the maturity to discern the causal relations between the 
model’s actions and the outcome of those actions. Yet the older children we 
tested were more inclined than the younger children to copy the model. Also, 
children who were first given opportunity to discover the affordances of the 
test apparatus still reproduced the model’s actions and did so at similar rates 
to children who were not given such opportunity. Even when children 
discovered on their own how to open all three apparatuses by hand, upon 
subsequent demonstration of a more complicated method incorporating 
irrelevant actions each of these children persisted in copying the adult. It 
isthus unlikely that children’s high fidelity imitation is solely attributable to 
theircapacity for causal understanding. 
No previous study has documented imitation across such starkly 
contrasting cultures and test environments. The similarity of performance is 
profound: children living in remote, impoverished Bushman communities, 
tested sitting on the ground, beneath a tree imitated in ways indistinct from 
children living in an industrialised, urban city tested inside, sitting at a desk. 
Their performance was similarly unaffected by age, cultural background of the 
model, or the children’s opportunity to learn on their own how to operate the 
apparatus. The current study thus presentssignificant evidence of over-
imitation as a universal human trait.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence of over-imitation in any non-human 
animal4. For example, in their now seminal work, Horner and 
Whiten3documented how 3- to 4-year-old children will imitate an adult’s entire 
sequence of actions, including those that are obviously irrelevant, whereas 
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chimpanzees will only replicate actions that are causally related to the desired 
outcome. Unlike children, chimpanzee copyingbehaviour appears to be driven 
by a prioritization of outcomes over actions. 
This distinction between action and outcome is an important one. We 
have demonstrated here how young children are drawn towards copying the 
actions they see adults perform, so much so that children will persistently 
replicate the actions of an adult even if such actions interfere with production 
of the desired outcome345. Although at first glance such behaviour seems 
maladaptive,we view it as quintessential to the development and transmission 
of human culture. Consider the multitude of complex social activities humans 
engage in. We make tools together, court each other, develop political 
institutions, construct dwellings, and prepare meals. But precisely how we 
engage in these activities differs, often strikingly, from one community to 
another: Human behaviour varies profoundly across cultures, and this 
profound cultural variation is uniquely human2021. Critically, in understanding 
aspects of human behaviour that are culturally instantiated, it is knowing the 
way things are done that is important, not what gets done. Knowing that a 
group of people cook meat (an 'end') provides only limited information about 
their cultural heritage. Knowing how they prepared and cooked that meat (the 
'means') tells you far more. When analysing cultural differences, means are 
more important than ends. And this focus on means over ends is precisely 
what is entailed in over-imitation. Over-imitation should not, therefore, be 
viewed as a quirk of the psychology laboratory but as providing a glimpse into 
the origins of our human propensity to follow those around us and to do as 
others do, irrespective of the logic underpinning such behaviour.  
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It is important to note that children do not blindly copy everything they 
see adults do. Characterised by some as selective imitators222324, children will 
make judgements about what actions to copy based on a host of variables, 
including the apparent intentions of the model and the situational constraints 
confronting both model and child. Such characterisation adds spice to the 
growing debate as to why children over-imitate. Targeted research is now 
needed to provide a clearer picture of the circumstances that determine when 
children will do precisely as others have done and when they instead choose 
their own actions.  
Other animals use tools and may have the rudiments of culture, but no 
animal uses tools or has developed culture with the breadth and complexity of 
our species.In over-imitation we see a mechanism for the rapid, high fidelity 
inter-generational transmission of tool-use skills andfor the perpetuation and 
generation of cultural forms.The study of this behaviour promises to provide 
critical insight into the development of these two core human traits.  
METHODS SUMMARY 
Subjects in Experiment 1 were 32 children aged between 2 and 6 years. The 16Brisbane 
children were recruited from a childcare centre adjacent to the university. The 16 Bushman 
children were tested at two sites, Witdraai(South Africa) and Ngwatle(Botswana). The 
Witdraai children were recruited through the South African San Institute (SASI) and the 
Ngwatlechildren through local community contacts. Sixty-two children aged between 2 and 13 
years participated in Experiment 2. These children – members of the !Xun and Khwe 
communities - were living in Platfontein, a Bushman settlement on the outskirts of Kimberley, 
a country town in South Africa’s Northern Cape. They were recruited via SASI. KT has been 
working with the Kalahari communities for over 15 years and is a trusted visitor.  
Children participated in one of two conditions. In a Demonstration Conditionchildren 
watched an adult touch a novel box with a miscellaneous object (e.g., a blue stick) in a 
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causally irrelevant way (e.g., wiping it across the top of the box). The object was then used in 
a causally connected manner to open the box (e.g., by poking out dowels that secured the lid 
of the box shut). When the box was opened a hidden toy was revealed. The demonstration 
was repeated twice more. Following the third demonstration the box and object were given to 
the child who was given 60 seconds to play with the items. This procedure was repeated for 
two more apparatus, each with different action-object pairings (see Supplementary Material 
for full details). Children in a No Demonstration condition were given the boxes and 
associated objects one by one, but did not see any actions demonstrated. In Experiment 2, 
children assigned to the No-Demonstration condition were subsequently shown the target 
actions after their unguided exploration of the apparatus.  
Full Methodsand any associated references are available in the online 
version of the paper at www.nature.com/nature. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. Southern Africa test locations for Experiment 1 (Witdraai and 
Ngwatle) and Experiment 2 (Kimberly), Map adapted from Willet  et al.16 
Figure 2.Causally relevant action for one box being demonstrated in the 
Kalahari. 
Figure 3. Mean number (and standard error) of boxes on which children 
produced the irrelevant actions and opened by object across conditions in 
Experiment 1 (Demonstration and No Demonstration) and Experiment 2 
(Demonstration, No demonstration Phase and Post-Demonstration Phase). 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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